The role of a good R&D Department cannot be overemphasized; the future of the company depends on it. To be able to bring fresh ideas to market is necessary for survival. But into the 80’s we were scrimping more and more on this function. Consolidation plans were front-and-center at this time, not the bringing to market new (and expensive) machinery. There were some collaborations made with cutting tool manufacturers to highlight their tools on our lathes, thereby sharing the costs. But these never got by the sales brochure stage, ending up usually with just one machine so equipped.

After the announcement of the move to Connecticut, the mood was sour; there were not too many people who wanted to leave town. Waterbury-Farrel continued to hold interviews, and tried to cajole people into relocating, but the effort was in vain. There were layoffs thruout the office and shop; a lot of our parts were now being machined at our parent plant in Connecticut instead of here in town. Then shipped up for assembly. At the end of 1983 about 60 additional union workers were given their pink slips. Merry Christmas. Only about 90 union workers remained at J&L into the new year. Business continued to decline. But the decline was felt thru out all the local manufacturers, not just as badly.

All thru this time, there were forces at work in the background trying to keep J&L open, and thwart the move. Bob Jones, a former VP of J&L, was behind one of the buyout attempts, but it failed. I was not privy to the details, so I do not know what transpired. I do know there was bad blood between the union and Bob Jones, so that may have been a factor. A perspective buyer named Donald Hoodes came into town and held several meetings with us. I remember one meeting at the high school where a lot of questions were thrown at him. But we were looking for a Knight on a White Horse, and he was the only one in sight. We didn’t know just what talent he and his people had to offer. It didn’t take long to realize that they had no real interest in the company, just its assets. I waited for an audience with some of the new owners, outlining some sort of plan. There were many people who bailed out, important people who should have been talked into staying; but nothing like that happened. I had a job offer at GE in Rutland, and told my boss. Nobody from the front office came around to change my mind. I should have taken the offer, in hindsight. But being comfortable with my job, and having a short commute, I stayed. Our insurance plan under Textron had been great, but soon the benefits would change, and there would be problems getting reimbursed for our medical bills. We all took pay cuts, shop and office. Turning J&L around in these circumstances was a daunting task.

It was early summer of 1985, and the Textron sale of J&L was done, Donald Hoodes being the buyer. At the time, 20 years was the rule for taking your retirement money out of the Textron Pension Plan. It had been 20 years and 2 weeks for me. I opted to “take the money and run”, and rolled it over into a 401(k) plan with a local broker.

The IMTS (International Machine Tool Show) is a bi-annual gathering held in Chicago. All the major machine tool builders strive to attend, and to bring their latest technology to showcase. This show had its birth in the 20’s, but not in Chicago; that didn’t happen until 1947. It was an important event that helped manufacturers gain recognition and drive sales. It was also a very expensive undertaking that required months of planning. The first thing we had to do was to determine just what machinery we were to show; then draw up a floor plan as to how we wanted to display them. We then had to contact the IMTS Show Committee in Chicago to rent the necessary floor space. I’m not sure if they determined where we would be located, and in which building or floor, but eventually we were given a “time slot” as to when our trucks had to be in Chicago for unloading. Because the show was held in several buildings (and not all in the same location), the IMTS planning board worked closely with the local Chicago “riggers” (those people who did the actual moving of all machinery). The machinery had to be unloaded in a certain sequence in order to fill each building from back to front. If you missed your time slot, it meant extra work to move your machine past spots already filled. These riggers were all strongly unionized, and did not take kindly to tardy arrivals (read extra $$$). I was not involved in any of the planning of these events, and only toward the end of my time at J&L did I attend the show (in 1982, 1984 and 1986).

Jones as well as the other local shops, had been attending these shows for years. We actually exhibited the very first NC lathe there, back in 1955. I remember some of the older engineers talking about the excitement that it created (they actually nicknamed the machine “Herbert”). But that was before my time in the business.

During the heyday of the TNC product line, J&L was a big presence at these shows. We had elaborate displays highlighting our machinery, and of course we hired our share of pretty models to help. Our sales staff were suited up properly, and we had all the necessary sales brochures to hand out to perspective customers. Wining and dining were the order of the day, and Chicago was the town to do it in.

But as the years went by, it was evident that our overseas competition was gaining ground. There were more and more foreign machine displays every time I attended the show. I do know that we were told that we were entering into an era of “Global Competition”, but it seems to me that the deck was being stacked against U.S. manufacturing by special interest groups who were successful in getting some of our fundamental laws rewritten to benefit them. As a result, our manufacturing base in this country has declined to a dangerous level; good paying jobs are scarce; we have killed the goose that laid the Golden Egg (the American worker, who made good money, and spent it on American goods).

The machine tool marketplace was changing. Up to this point J&L had carved a niche by catering to our customer; most any special requirement was quoted, and we usually got the job. But doing this results in delayed delivery times. Our foreign competition had been busy; some had already built factories in this country, others had plans. And they had built and warehoused machinery to allow them to deliver their product quickly. Ultimately, our customers were forced to accept these machines, even though they did not meet their “specs”. Delivery time was the deciding factor. Their specs took a back seat.

Our bosses at Waterbury-Farrel were busy with expansion plans for us at this time; perhaps this was camouflage for what was really happening in the back rooms. Our business continued to decline, and rumors started appearing; there was talk about moving the grinder product line south; maybe even consolidating all of our resources in one place? The comparator product had already left town. Any Plant #2 personnel still with us had been relocated to Plant #1. Our new president (up from Texas) departed. Who filled these shoes after that I cannot remember (but I believe it was someone from Waterbury). There were numerous layoffs, both in the shop and office. But not just at J&L, all the shops in town saw a decline.

One of the Waterbury-Farrel executives inadvertently left a copy of a secret memo in a coping machine at J&L. It was the spring of 1983. The memo was discovered by one of our secretaries, and before long everyone in the plant knew about it. It briefly outlined a possible move of all of the J&L product to Connecticut. Of course this caused an outrage; a complete surprise. Our parent company tried to smooth over this discovery, even going so far as to have a general meeting with everyone on the shop floor. The main speaker was none other than the president of Waterbury-Farrel, Hanspeter Schwartz. He insisted there was no plan to move J&L south, despite the discovery of the memo.

In September of 1983 there was an official announcement that indeed we would be moved south and consolidated with our parent company in Cheshire, Connecticut.

A move of this magnitude has to be carefully planned; for the company to survive there had to be a core group of key employees willing to relocate. Having people with product knowledge is essential for continuity. There would of course be new people to train, but who could do that training but us? So there was a large effort made by Waterbury-Farrel to win over as many of us to The Cause as possible. There were several charter bus trips to Connecticut to help us meet our “cousins” there; the beer and wine flowed; good cheer all around. Camaradrie; this effort was long-running, going well into 1984. Interviews were held with each employee to see who might be willing to move.

The decision had been made to move the comparator division to York, South Carolina. Textron had an empty Talon Zipper plant that they wanted to use, and the accountants claimed much cost savings from moving south. Many of the comparator workers refused to move; some people in Plant #1 expressed an interest in joining the exodus. Compromises were made to accommodate these people (at least one person was nearing retirement age, and figured, why not let the company move me at their expense?). Of course, the “cost savings” to the company never materialized (it seldom does). The lack of skilled craftsmen hobbled the product right from the start. What was once a shining example of Yankee Ingenuity became another financial leak in the Mother Ship.

In the meantime, we continued on in Plant #1, trying to absorb all the changes taking place. The new MRP (Material Readiness Plan) system required quite a lot of training for us. I was among several people sent to Atlanta for a week of this training. Many others who were closer to the “action” needed multiple week training sessions. This system was suppose to allow us to get a better handle on the procurement process; how to track the progress of various ordered parts more efficiently. Most of the actual work was done by the people in the Shop Office.

Our machines were built using what was called a “Machine Writeup”, listing all the assemblies required to achieve a complete machine. Our numbering system consisted of “assembly lists”, each of which was a complete sub-assembly in itself. For instance, A-12345 might be a machine base, A-21683 could be a slide assembly; each and every TNC model had a “Family Tree” which listed all the sub-assemblies required to build a complete “standard” machine. All the Tech Writer had to do was to  access the “Family Tree” for a particular model, print out the machine order, and issue it to the Shop Office. Then the order was plugged into the system to start the build. The new MRP system would schedule each sub-assembly so that the necessary parts would be done at the appropriate time based on final machine build dates, and taking into account the “lead times” to make every single part. Not a big deal if you are building one machine at a time, but if twenty are on the books, it becomes quite a project.

Of course a lot of the J&L TNC’s had “special” requirements based on customer standards or requests. These special items required additional engineering and were at an added cost to the customer (sometimes quite large additional costs were involved). These “special” assembly lists would be issued by engineering after completion of the design work.

Our overseas competition took another approach to this, offering just a “standard” machine, with little or no deviation offered or available. But at less cost, and quicker delivery. The machinery itself may have been less robust in design, but a new philosophy was emerging in machine tools; less costly, quick delivery, disposable machines began to take over the marketplace.

As the decade ended, we continued to have plenty of work. But that’s the way it is in the machine tool business. The usual sequence of our employment is out of sync with the national trends (I.E. we were busy working on our order backlog when the general economy is down, and when the economy picks up, we are in a decline due to lack of orders). And that is the way it was in 1979; there was a recession going on, which would last into the early 80’s. Inflation was into the double digits, and unemployment nationally was worse than during the Great Depression.

The large machine order from New Departure had really tied up our resources, both in engineering and manufacuring. Our quoted delivery times for “standard” machines had lengthened, sometimes to 12 months or more. As a result, many of our potential customers were forced to buy their machinery from other sources. And the Japanese were poised to take advantage. Once you lose a customer to another brand, it is very hard to reverse the situation. The J&L design philosophy had always been to create a very robust machine, with a long service life, and support it with a dedicated service department. In effect, these machines could remain productive for decades. But as the electronic controls became more and more sophisticated, it wasn’t the mechanical design of the machine that was the weak point, it was the electronics. There were several NC control manufacturers vying for market share at this time. Allen Bradley, General Automation, GE-Fanuc, and others. The evolution of the controls drove the marketplace; and as we all know, the rate of change accelerates with time, especially in the electronics field. Early NC units required battery backup to retain programming information; as time went on, the battery requirement disappeared. Todays hand held electronic calculators are a good example of just how tiny the package has become. Also, as time went on, the servo drives and their feedback devices (which control the machine tool slides) have become phenomenally accurate.

As the 80’s dawned, we inherited a new Operations manager from Bell Helicopter / Textron. He came out of Texas with his Lincoln and cowboy hat, and never really connected with our people. We launched a new MRP system that would theoretically help us get a hand on future parts ordering. Based on previous ordering history, we launched into  procuring long-lead parts based on future forecasts. But due to the recession, these orders never materialized. We ended up spending a huge amount of money on parts we couldn’t use. Being in engineering, I remember being asked to use any in-stock items if possible on future designs.

The recession hit all the shops hard. There were 1200 people working at J&L at the end of the decade; but the decline had begun. Our success with New Departure caused a loss of customers, our internal problems began to accumulate, and in just a short time, a monumental decision by our parent company would signal the end.